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The Right to Pre-trial Silence: 
Where Does It Stand and  
What’s Next after Singh? 
Jamie Klukach and Diana Lumba* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In R. v. Singh,1 released November 1, 2007, the Supreme Court of 
Canada filled in the gaps that were left by its earlier jurisprudence on the 
section 7 right to silence during custodial police interrogation. The scope 
of the right to silence in this context lingered as a live issue after the 
Court’s landmark decision in R. v. Hebert2 in 1990; and R. v. Oickle,3 
rendered a decade later in 2000, deepened the need for clarification 
about the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’4 role in protecting 
a detainee’s pre-trial right to silence during police questioning. The 
intervenors climbed aboard in Singh, an indication of the importance of 
the issue that stood to be resolved.5 
This paper will look at how the Court’s resolution of this issue came, 
perhaps, as somewhat unexpected against the backdrop of Hebert and 
Oickle. It will also consider what directions the law might now move in, 
toward further refinement of the principles set down in Singh. 
                                                                                                             
*
 Jamie Klukach is counsel at the Crown Law Office, Criminal Division in Toronto. Diana 
Lumba completed her articles at that office. The views expressed in this paper are those of the 
authors and are in no manner representative of the office of the Ministry of the Attorney General of 
Ontario. 
1
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2
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3
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 Interventions were granted to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, the Attorney 
General of Ontario, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Criminal Lawyers’ 
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II. THE ROAD TO SINGH 
Singh casts the section 7 right to silence during detained police 
questioning as being the functional equivalent of the common law 
confessions rule.6 It lays to rest the controversy concerning the interplay 
between the confessions rule and the Charter right to silence that 
followed Hebert and Oickle. Writing for the Court’s majority in Singh, 
Charron J. firmly declared that, in this context, section 7 has no life 
independent of the confessions rule: 
… [T]he confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right 
to silence in circumstances where an obvious person in authority is 
interrogating a person who is in detention because, in such 
circumstances, the two tests are functionally equivalent.7 
In Hebert,8 the Court recognized a pre-trial right to silence under 
section 7 of the Charter at the investigative stage of a criminal 
prosecution. Hebert dealt with incriminating statements elicited from an 
accused in a jail cell by an undercover police officer. The confessions 
rule offered no protection in these circumstances: the statements would 
have been admissible because the accused did not appreciate that he was 
making them to a person in authority. The Court held that the Charter 
provided protection against unfairness where the confessions rule would 
not. In defining the pre-trial right to silence, the Court drew on the 
confessions rule and the privilege against self-incrimination and their 
unifying theme of “choice”. In the circumstances of Hebert, the conduct 
of the police prevented the detainee from being able to make a 
meaningful choice about whether to speak to them. 
Although the question of permissible limits to police questioning of 
a detainee who knows that she is talking to the police did not factually 
arise in Hebert, the Court provided some guidance on the scope of the 
right to silence in this context, again tying it into the concept of 
“choice”: 
… there is nothing in the rule to prohibit police from questioning the 
accused in the absence of counsel after the accused has retained 
counsel. Presumably, counsel will inform the accused of the right to 
remain silent. If the police are not posing as undercover officers and 
the accused chooses to volunteer information, there will be no violation 
                                                                                                             
6
 Singh, supra, note 1, at paras. 25 and 39. 
7
 Id., at para. 39. 
8
 Supra, note 2. 
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of the Charter. Police persuasion, short of denying the suspect the right 
to choose or depriving him of an operating mind, does not breach the 
right to silence.9 
And: 
The state is not obliged to protect the suspect against making a 
statement; indeed, it is open to the state to use legitimate means of 
persuasion to encourage the suspect to do so.10
 
This interplay between the common law rule and the Charter was 
explored further in Oickle11 when the Court considered the common law 
limits on police interrogation under the confessions rule. Justice 
Iacobucci commented that the case provided an important opportunity 
“to set out the proper scope of the confessions rule”, noting that the issue 
had not been directly addressed by the Court since the introduction of 
the Charter.12  
The thematic thrust of Oickle was that common law voluntariness is 
concerned chiefly with the reliability of statements obtained through 
police interrogation to safeguard against the danger of false confessions 
and resulting miscarriages of justice. At the outset of discussing the 
“precise scope” of the confessions rule “today”, Iacobucci J. stated: 
… the confessions rule is concerned with voluntariness, broadly 
defined. One of the predominant reasons for this concern is that 
involuntary confessions are more likely to be unreliable. The 
confessions rule should recognize which interrogation techniques 
commonly produce false confessions so as to avoid miscarriages of 
justice.13 
This philosophical approach was evident throughout the judgment. 
The focus on reliability as the cornerstone of voluntariness shifted but 
briefly when the Court discussed the “community shock” test that was 
articulated by Lamer J. in R. v. Rothman.14
 
It was only in relation to 
police trickery that would shock the conscience of the community that 
the Court allowed for accommodation, within the confessions rule, of an 
objective that is distinct from reliability; that is based on concern for 
                                                                                                             
9
 Id., at para. 73. 
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 Id., at para. 53. 
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 Supra, note 3. 
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 Id., at para. 23.  
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 Id., at para. 32. 
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 [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
482 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
“maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system” and for 
“protection of the accused’s rights and fairness in the criminal process”.15 
Apart from the kind of egregious and appalling conduct that would 
meet the “community shock” standard, the Court expressed no concern 
for the treatment of accused by the police beyond its potential to impugn 
the statement’s reliability. The modern day confessions rule that emerged 
in Oickle relegates fairness to an afterthought, once the reliability of the 
statement is assured. If the conduct of the police could have induced a 
false confession, then it was, no doubt, unfair to boot. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Oickle was the subject of much academic criticism for its 
near-exclusive focus on reliability and seeming disregard for procedural 
fairness in delineating the limits on police conduct under the common 
law rule.16 
Just eight months before its judgment in Singh, the Court reaffirmed 
Oickle’s reliability-preoccupied formulation of the confessions rule in 
the case of R. v. Spencer.17
 
The Court’s determined focus on reliability as 
the barometer of police impropriety under the confessions rule fit 
sensibly with its earlier decision in Hebert. When the Court turned, in 
Oickle, to set out the proper scope of the confessions rule, it had already 
recognized, in Hebert, the additional scope for protection against unfair 
police practices afforded by section 7. Indeed, Iacobucci J. specifically 
stated that “the focus [of Hebert] was on defining constitutional rights”18 
and that: 
… it would be a mistake to confuse it [the common law confessions 
rule] with the protections given by the Charter. While obviously it may 
be appropriate, as in Hebert, … to interpret one in light of the other, it 
would be a mistake to assume one subsumes the other entirely.19 
With the Charter in its back pocket to take care of fairness concerns 
that did not touch on reliability, the Court adopted a relatively 
conservative approach to the confessions rule. There was simply no need 
to radically update it. If the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the statement was voluntary, then it would still be open to the 
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 Oickle, supra, note 3, at paras. 65-67, 69. 
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 See, e.g., Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s Recipe for Coercive Interrogation” 
(2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188; Edmund Thomas, “Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the 
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 [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”]. 
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 Oickle, supra, note 3, at para. 29. 
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 Id., at para. 31. 
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accused to establish, on the lower standard of proof, that the conduct of 
the police nonetheless offended against her section 7 right to silence. 
The Charter could provide residual protection against unfairness that was 
not caught by the confessions rule. One might say that Hebert offered a 
level of comfort to the Court which enabled its decision in Oickle. 
But in Singh, the Court turned sharply from what its earlier 
judgments appeared to forecast. The modern confessions rule, as it 
emerged from Oickle, was grafted onto the Charter right to silence in this 
context. Justice Charron acknowledged that section 7 might afford 
additional protection beyond the common law in different contexts (as it 
had in Hebert), but not in this one.20 
No doubt, Singh came as a surprise to defence counsel who, after 
Oickle, were crafting their arguments for exclusion, based on unfair 
police conduct, around section 7. Indeed, in Singh itself, the voluntariness 
of the statements was conceded, both at trial and on appeal.21 It was 
Singh’s position that although his statements to the police were voluntary 
in the common law sense, the conduct of the police — who persisted in 
questioning him in the face of 18 assertions that he wished to remain 
silent — so influenced or interfered with his exercise of choice, that his 
right to remain silent was trammelled upon. In the end, of course, his 
concession as to voluntariness went a long way toward deciding the 
section 7 argument. 
III. A BALANCING OF INTERESTS 
The principle against self-incrimination, which grounds the section 7 
right to silence, has been described by the Court as perhaps the single 
most important organizing principle in criminal law.22
 
The right to 
silence at trial is specifically protected by section 11(c) of the Charter. 
With few exceptions, the Crown cannot make evidentiary use of an 
accused’s silence upon arrest or at trial.23 
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 Singh, supra, note 1, at para. 40. 
21
 Id., at para. 22. 
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 R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jones, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 42, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.); R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 10, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 
451 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. Chambers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 108, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1293 (S.C.C.); R. v. Noble, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 40, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (S.C.C.); R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.). 
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As observed by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Hebert, the right 
to silence is equally important at the investigatorial phase: 
The protection conferred by a legal system which grants the accused 
immunity from incriminating himself at trial but offers no protection 
with respect to pre-trial statements would be illusory.24 
At this stage, the accused is particularly vulnerable to self-incrimination. 
He or she is within the custody and control of the state without the same 
luxury of protracted consultation with counsel and reasoned reflection 
that would bear on a decision to waive the right to silence at trial by 
testifying. One might expect, then, special sensitivity to the crucial 
importance of the right to silence at this juncture — and to the impact of 
police conduct on the detainee’s exercise of choice. 
Yet, Singh shows a high degree of tolerance for police persuasion or 
influence upon the detainee’s decision to speak. Justice Charron 
reasoned that this tolerance strikes a necessary balance between the 
accused’s interests and the competing interests of the state in the 
effective investigation and prosecution of crime. She noted that police 
interrogation plays a particularly important role in the investigation of 
crime, stating: 
One can readily appreciate that the police could hardly investigate 
crime without putting questions to persons from whom it is thought 
that useful information may be obtained. The person suspected of 
having committed the crime being investigated is no exception. Indeed, 
if the suspect in fact committed the crime, he or she is likely the person 
who has the most information to offer about the incident. Therefore, 
the common law also recognizes the importance of police interrogation 
in the investigation of crime.25
 
In Singh, the Court placed an extraordinary premium on state 
investigative interests in the context of post-arrest interrogation. This is 
well illustrated by the starkly different outcome to a similar balancing 
exercise in R. v. Couture,26 which was decided by the Court some five 
months prior to Singh. At stake in Couture was the accused’s interest in 
protecting the harmony of his marriage and, in the balance, it beat out 
competing societal interests in effective law enforcement. 
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 Hebert, supra, note 2, at para. 45. 
25
 Singh, supra, note 1, at para. 28. 
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 [2007] S.C.J. No. 28, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Couture”]. 
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At issue in Couture was the admissibility of statements provided by 
Couture’s wife to the police. Couture confessed to her that he had killed 
two young women. After their marriage, the wife approached the police 
and told them about his confessions. She was non-compellable by the 
Crown because of the operation of the common law rule of spousal 
incompetency so the Crown argued that her hearsay statements were 
admissible on principled analysis. 
Even though the common law rule, which is testimonial in nature, 
has no application to the out-of-court statements of a spouse, Charron J., 
for the majority, reasoned that its underlying rationales would be 
undermined by the admission of spousal hearsay statements made during 
the course of the marriage. The policy rationales which underpin the 
rule of spousal incompetency relate to the promotion of marital harmony 
and the repugnance of compelling one spouse to testify against the other 
in court. The rule has been criticized for being archaic, historically 
rooted in outmoded views of women and marriage, and as a senseless 
obstacle to truth-seeking that unjustifiably suppresses relevant evidence. 
In R. v. Salituro,27 the Court described it as antithetical to Charter-based 
equality values and signalled to Parliament that it was time to consider 
its abolition. But in Couture, the Court breathed new life into it, 
extending its policy-based rationale well beyond testimonial incapacity 
at the cost of excluding highly cogent incriminating evidence. 
This concern for the accused’s interest in protecting his marriage at 
such sizeable expense to the truth-seeking process seems diametrically at 
odds with the Court’s approach in Singh. One might expect that an 
accused’s interest in being protected against the risk of self-
incrimination by having his or her own statements used against him or 
her is at least as pressing as an accused’s interest in being protected 
against any potential disruption to his or her marriage, brought about by 
permitting the statements of the spouse to incriminate the accused. 
Surely the interest against self-incrimination, founded, as it is, on a 
central organizing principle of criminal law, out-classes an interest that 
rests on a shaky, outdated policy foundation. Both Singh and Couture 
were charged with murder, so society’s interest in having all reliable 
evidence come forth that could lead to a conviction was present in equal 
force in both cases. Ironically, if the police had pressured Mr. Couture to 
confess by relentlessly bombarding him with questions despite his 
protestations, his confession would have been admitted; yet, his 
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 [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.). 
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confession to his spouse — who volunteered it to the police without 
prompting — was excluded. 
IV. WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR THE PRE-TRIAL RIGHT TO SILENCE? 
1. Interplay with Section 24(2) 
The hard line taken by the Court on the section 7 right to pre-trial 
silence in Singh may have been influenced by the strictures of R. v. 
Stillman,28 which effectively created an automatic rule of exclusion for 
conscriptive evidence obtained pursuant to a Charter breach. Stillman 
left virtually no flexibility to admit conscriptive, non-discoverable 
evidence under section 24(2), holding that its admission will ordinarily 
result in unfairness, thereby warranting exclusion under the “trial 
fairness” branch of the section 24(2) analysis without regard for the 
other “Collins” factors.29 
In Hebert, which predated Stillman, the Court envisioned a more 
flexible application of section 24(2). Justice McLachlin (as she then 
was), specifically adverted to the possible admission of evidence 
obtained through a breach of the Charter-protected right to silence. She 
wrote: 
Drawing the balance where I have suggested the Charter draws it 
permits the courts to correct abuses of power against the individual, 
while allowing them to nevertheless admit evidence under s. 24(2) 
where, despite a Charter violation, the admission would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.30
 
And: 
I should not be taken as suggesting that violation of an accused’s right 
to silence under s. 7 automatically means that the evidence must be 
excluded under s. 24(2). I would not wish to rule out the possibility 
that there may be circumstances in which a statement might be 
received where the suspect has not been accorded a full choice in the 
sense of having decided, after full observance of all rights, to make a 
statement voluntarily.31 
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 [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stillman”]. 
29
 Id., at paras. 102, 119. 
30
 Hebert, supra, note 2, at para. 71. 
31
 Id., at para. 88; see also para. 79. 
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Stillman could have had a chilling effect on the Court’s willingness 
to more broadly construe the section 7 right in this context since 
statement evidence obtained in breach of section 7 will always be 
conscriptive in nature and subject to its rule of automatic exclusion. 
Broader recognition of the right would mean that highly probative and 
reliable evidence would routinely be lost without consideration of how 
relatively serious the police conduct giving rise to the breach was, or 
whether its exclusion would have a deleterious impact on the repute of 
the administration of justice. 
Sensitivity to the implications of a rigid section 24(2) analysis 
factored into Charron J.’s reasons in Singh. The appellant argued that 
section 7 imposed an obligation on police to refrain altogether from 
trying to question a detainee once that detainee asserted the wish to 
remain silent. In rejecting that position, Charron J. observed that the 
protection afforded by the confessions rule was directed at “the potential 
abuse by the state of its superior powers over a detained suspect”; yet 
under the Appellant’s suggested approach, “any statement obtained after 
the suspect asserts his right to silence would be of questionable 
admissibility”.32 She further commented that this would be so “regardless 
of whether there is a causal nexus between the conduct of the police and 
the making of the statement”.33 The concern was that statements would 
be excluded whether or not the conduct of the police played a role in 
their making. 
In R. v. Grant,34 the Court has been asked to reconsider Stillman. 
Grant made a self-incriminating statement to the police that led to the 
discovery of a loaded revolver in his possession. He was walking down 
the street and attracted the attention of police officers who approached 
him and asked a few “general questions” that prompted him to divulge 
that he was in possession of some marijuana and a gun. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal found that Grant was arbitrarily detained — but did not 
exclude the evidence, even though its admission would have some 
impact on trial fairness. Justice Laskin commented on the relevance of 
the police’s conduct to the section 24(2) analysis: 
The nature of the police’s conduct that yielded the conscriptive 
evidence is relevant because it is directed to the extent of the state’s 
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 [2006] O.J. No. 2179 (Ont. C.A.); appeal to S.C.C. heard April 24, 2008, judgment 
reserved [hereinafter “Grant”]. 
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interference with the accused’s autonomy and with the accused’s 
freedom of choice whether to participate in the creation of self-
incriminatory evidence. The more invasive the interference, the more 
serious the impact on trial fairness; the less invasive the interference, 
the less serious the impact on trial fairness.35
 
The Crown/respondent in Grant has asked the Court to depart from 
the ritualistic rule of exclusion that emerged in Stillman and to restore 
the trial fairness branch of the section 24(2) analysis to a more equal 
footing. There is a wide spectrum of police conduct having varying 
degrees of influence on the detained suspect’s decision to speak. A more 
flexible section 24(2) analysis would not require the exclusion of highly 
probative evidence in every case. There would be scope to consider the 
relative seriousness of the breach weighed up against the adverse effect 
on the administration of justice that would flow from the exclusion of 
reliable evidence that is essential to the prosecution of a serious criminal 
charge. If the Crown is successful in Grant, we may see a gradual 
willingness by the Court to construe the section 7 Charter right to silence 
more broadly and a softening of the stance taken in Singh. A new 
approach to section 24(2) would permit important recognition of the 
content of the section 7 right without the resulting disproportionate cost 
to the overall administration of justice that the current, “Stillman model” 
leads to. 
2. Greater Scrutiny of the Quality of Choice Exercised by the 
Individual 
Now that the voluntariness test sets the constitutional standard for 
the section 7 right to remain silent, the focus of the inquiry necessarily 
shifts from the conduct of the police to its impact on the particular 
detainee. 
The central issue in determining the voluntariness of a statement 
under the confessions rule (and now, under section 7) is whether the 
suspect’s choice to speak was freely made or whether it was so 
encumbered, influenced or interfered with by the conduct of the police 
that it cannot be seen as valid. The classic “Ibrahim rule”, explained and 
reaffirmed in Oickle, is concerned with police conduct that overbears the 
will of the detainee, meaning that the statement would not have been 
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 Id., at para. 55. 
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made but for the improper inducement. As explained by Fish J., in 
Spencer: 
In such cases, the will of the detainee has not been “overborne” in 
the sense that he or she “has lost any meaningful, independent ability 
to choose to remain silent” … rather, the will of the detainee is said to 
have been “overborne” only in the sense that he or she would not 
otherwise have given a statement but was persuaded to do so in order 
to achieve an expected result — to avoid threatened pain or achieve 
promised gain. A statement thus given is the result of a calculated 
decision by an operating mind; it is nonetheless considered 
“involuntary” for the reasons set out in both [Ibrahim v. The King, 
[1914] A.C. 599] and [R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)].36 
In Singh, the Court recognized that persistent police questioning could 
also amount to an improper inducement that overbears the will of the 
detainee, so as to render his or her statement involuntary.37 
The test for whether the conduct of the police effectively deprived 
the suspect of the right to choose to remain silent is an objective one;38 
however, the individual circumstances of the detainee are relevant to the 
assessment. The “need to be sensitive to the particularities of the individual 
suspect” was emphasized by Iacobucci J. in Oickle with the following 
examples: 
False confessions are particularly likely when the police 
interrogate particular types of suspects, including suspects who are 
especially vulnerable as a result of their background, special 
characteristics, or situation, suspects who have compliant personalities 
and, in rare instances, suspects whose personalities make them prone to 
accept and believe police suggestions made during the course of the 
interrogation. 
..... 
The strength of mind and will of the accused, the influence of 
custody or its surroundings, the effect of questions or of conversation, 
all call for delicacy in appreciation of the part they have played behind 
the admission, and to enable a Court to decide whether what was said 
                                                                                                             
36
 Spencer, supra, note 17, at para. 32. 
37
 Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, at para. 47 (S.C.C.). 
38
 Id. 
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was freely and voluntarily said, that is, was free from the influence of 
hope or fear aroused by them.39
 
There was regard for “the particular individual and his or her 
circumstances” in appraising the strength of the inducement in Spencer 
where the Court was mindful of the trial judge’s observations that 
Spencer was “aggressive” and “a mature and savvy participant”.40 And in 
Singh, the Court endorsed as “particularly instructive”, Proulx J.A.’s 
judgment in R. v. Otis,41 excluding the confession of an emotionally 
vulnerable suspect who was subjected to persistent police questioning.42 
With less room to manoeuvre on the question of how far the police 
can go, we can expect to see more attention being paid to the personal 
circumstances and characteristics of individual accused and the contextual 
dynamics of police interrogation. The objective oppressiveness of police 
conduct will be magnified through the prism of a frail and weak 
personality. The vulnerability that inherently exists in circumstances of 
police custody and the power imbalance that underlies the dynamic 
between the detainee and the police can weigh in as important elements 
toward determining whether there has been an overbearing of the will so 
as to legally invalidate the choice to speak. 
A helpful analogy can be drawn to the examination of the quality of 
apparent consent to sexual activity in circumstances where the accused 
holds a position of trust, power or authority in relation to the complainant.43 
In R. v. Saint-Laurent,44 Fish J.A. (as he then was) considered the 
application of section 265(3)(d) of the Criminal Code. The accused was 
a psychotherapist charged with sexually assaulting two patients. The 
Crown argued that he exercised authority over both complainants in a 
way that deliberately induced their submission to sexual relations with 
him. Justice Fish cited the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
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 Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 42 (S.C.C.), quoting from W.S. 
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(1997) 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, at 120 and Rand J. in R. v. Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70, 
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 Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paras.13-15, 21 (S.C.C.). 
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 [2000] Q.J. No. 4320, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 416 (Que. C.A.). 
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 Singh, supra, note 37, at paras. 50, 53. 
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Norberg v. Wynrib45 which recognized that “a position of relative 
weakness can, in some circumstances, interfere with the freedom of a 
person’s will”46 and that “in certain circumstances, consent will be 
considered legally ineffective if it can be shown that there was such a 
disparity in the relative positions of the parties that the weaker party was 
not in a position to choose freely”.47 Justice Fish stressed that the trier of 
fact “must remain ever mindful of the vulnerability of the victim”48 in 
such circumstances because the quality of the victim’s apparent consent 
could be significantly compromised by them: 
As a matter both of language and of law, consent implies a reasonably 
informed choice, freely exercised. No such choice has been exercised 
where a person engages in sexual activity as a result of fraud, force, 
fear, or violence. 
..... 
“Consent” is, thus, stripped of its defining characteristics when it is 
applied to the submission, non-resistance, non-objection or even the 
apparent agreement, of a deceived, unconscious or compelled will.49 
These views were endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Matheson,50 which also involved a psychologist who exercised his 
control and authority over two patients to induce them to submit to 
sexual relations.  
More recently in R. v. S. (D.)51 the Ontario Court of Appeal found 
that the complainant’s consent was induced through the abuse of a 
position of power by the accused. The accused persuaded the 
complainant, his former girlfriend, to consent to sexual relations with 
him by threatening to disseminate nude photographs of her if she 
refused. Interestingly, the Court also held that there was no need to 
resort to section 273.1 of the Criminal Code because, in the 
circumstances, there was no voluntary agreement by the complainant to 
engage in sexual activity. The Court reasoned that the accused’s conduct 
exerted such extreme pressure on the complainant that she was unable to 
freely choose whether or not to engage in the sexual activity. Her 
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apparent choice to sexually submit to him was so qualitatively 
compromised by the potency of his threat that it was rendered legally 
invalid — even though she could have refused and faced the threatened 
consequences. The Court of Appeal’s judgment was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.52 
Borrowing from the principles in these cases, there is scope to 
develop a more context-sensitive appraisal of the legal effectiveness of a 
detainee’s “choice” to speak.  
3. Invigoration of the Section 10(b) Right to Counsel 
In the aftermath of Singh, arguments for the exclusion of self-
incriminating statements might meet with greater success if framed 
under the broader auspices of section 10(b) of the Charter. 
Unlike the section 7 right to silence, the section 10(b) guarantee has 
been more generously interpreted by the Court. In Singh, Charron J. 
distinguished between the two rights, stating: 
Under the Charter, the right to counsel, including an informational and 
implementational component, is provided for expressly. No such 
provision appears in respect of the right to silence.53 
She adopted this explanation of the reason for the difference: 
Although the right to counsel and right to silence are equally 
important rights, it does not follow that they will be protected in the 
same way … The right to silence, by its very nature, is exercised 
differently than the right to counsel and in this respect, the right to 
silence and right to counsel are not the same. The exercise of the right 
to silence is within the control of an accused who has an operating 
mind and is fully informed of his or her rights, provided the conduct of 
the authorities do not take away his or her ability to choose. In contrast, 
the exercise of the right to counsel is not within the control of an 
accused in detention. Rather, it is dependant upon the police 
facilitating the exercise of that right.54 
Central to the expansive approach taken to the right to counsel is 
recognition of its crucial role in ensuring that the accused understands 
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his or her rights; most importantly, the accused’s right to remain silent. 
This was discussed by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Hebert: 
The most important function of legal advice upon detention is to ensure 
that the accused understands his rights, chief among which is his right 
to silence. The detained suspect, potentially at a disadvantage in 
relation to the informed and sophisticated powers at the disposal of the 
state, is entitled to rectify the disadvantage by speaking to legal 
counsel at the outset, so that he is aware of his right not to speak to the 
police and obtains appropriate advice with respect to the choice he 
faces. Read together, ss. 7 and 10(b) confirm the right to silence in s. 7 
and shed light on its nature.55
 
The section 10(b) right has been cast as the watchdog of the right to 
silence. It is the detainee’s chief procedural protection at the 
investigative stage, when in police custody and most vulnerable to the 
risk of self-incrimination. 
The police must refrain from attempting to elicit evidence from a 
detainee until that detainee has had a reasonable opportunity to confer 
with counsel.56
 
Once a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct 
counsel has been provided, the police may question the accused. 
However, when there is a change in the jeopardy faced by the accused or 
a fundamental change in the purpose of the investigation, police must 
suspend questioning and, again, provide a reasonable opportunity to 
exercise the section 10(b) right.57 
Consider the detainee who consults with counsel and then asks to do 
so again after police questioning is underway because he or she is 
thinking about providing a statement but would like to consult with his 
or her lawyer first. It may be that police have provided information or 
presented evidence that the detainee would like to share with the lawyer. 
Even though the extent of the detainee’s jeopardy and the purpose of the 
investigation have not changed, the risk of self-incrimination can easily 
increase as the interview progresses. Since the right to counsel is integral 
to protecting the right to silence, the refusal of renewed contact with 
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counsel in such circumstances could, arguably, result in a breach of the 
section 10(b) right.58 
Police conduct which undermines the solicitor/client relationship 
also runs afoul of the section 10(b) right. During an interrogation, police 
are, of necessity, trying to overcome the advice given by counsel. They 
cannot, however, belittle the accused’s lawyer so as to undermine his or 
her confidence in the relationship. In R. v. Burlingham,59 the police 
actively disparaged the accused’s lawyer; but there is scope to argue that 
less blatant conduct can produce the same effect. 
Persistent questioning in the face of an assertion of the wish to 
remain silent signals to the detainee that he or she should disregard the 
lawyer’s advice to remain silent. At a minimum, the message is implicit. 
Often, it is more direct. For instance, police may suggest that because 
they are present and the lawyer is not, they are in a better position to 
fully understand the detainee’s predicament and to provide guidance that 
serves his or her interests. 
The dissenting judgment in Singh was sensitive to implications to 
the appellant’s section 10(b) right arising from the interrogation tactics 
of the police. Justice Fish wrote: 
… the interrogator urged Mr. Singh, subtly but unmistakeably, to 
forsake his counsel’s advice.  
..... 
To the officer’s knowledge, Mr. Singh had been advised by his 
lawyer to exercise his right to silence. The officer, with irony, if not 
cynicism, discounted this “absolutely great advice” (his words) as 
something he too would say if he were Mr. Singh’s lawyer. And he 
then pressed Mr. Singh to instead answer his questions — “to confess 
no matter what”.  
Mr. Singh was thus deprived not only of his right to silence, but 
also, collaterally, of the intended benefit of his right to counsel. These 
rights are close companions, like glove and hand.60
 
This aspect of the interrogation was found to be “particularly disturbing”. 
                                                                                                             
58
 See R. v. Sinclair, [2008] B.C.J. No. 502 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted 
October 18, 2008 (file no. 32537; R. v. Badgerow, [2008] O.J. No. 3416 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Whitford, 
[1997] A.J. No. 309, 196 A.R. 97 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 117 C.C.C. (3d) vi. 
59
 [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.). 
60
 Singh, supra, note 37, at paras. 60-62. 
